In this short book Peter Charlton suggests that the final campaigns fought by Australian forces in the south-west Pacific were unnecessary, foisted upon our troops by an ambitious high command, notably General Sir Thomas Blarney. He argues that since Curtin had surrendered any Australian control over the use of its troops to MacArthur, it was left to Australia’s own generals to protect the country’s interests in circumstances where its political leaders had conspicuously failed. In so doing, these generals squandered Australian lives in a series of operations of dubious military value, using troops that were under-equipped and maintained, and ultimately seeking to win over public opinion by recommending a large number of decorations for valour in the field. The troops themselves were under no illusions about the value of their activities, and politicians had long ago abrogated their responsibility for setting out the political aims and limits of Australia’s military involvement. All in all, this was truly a “generals’ war”.