The last few years have seen a major reorientation of Australian defence policy. The Guam doctrine of limited commitment declared by the United States, the withdrawal of United States forces from mainland Southeast Asia, the British withdrawal of forces east of Suez and the substantial development of the capacities of regional countries, especially the ASEAN states, to provide for their own security all had major implications for Australian defence policy. Australia’s defence planners (and successive Australian Governments) concluded that our first priorities should be the defence of Australia with increasing independence, the encouragement of a favourable security environment in our region and the maintenance of ANZUS cooperation. This reorientation effectively spelt the end of the so-called ‘forward defence’ era and initiated a challenging process of transition.

Sketching in the background to current defence thinking is a rather essential precondition to making much sense of O’Connor’s contribution. Regrettably, he demonstrates little knowledge or understanding of recent developments in Australian defence concepts, nor the compelling reasons for them. His approach is to propose a defence policy that essentially ignores the primary changes in the international environment in the last two decades. His is an approach more in keeping with the late 1950s or mid­1960s than the late 1980s.